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Introduction
The classical secretary problem is one of the most popular problems in the area of Applied Probability, Economics, and related fields. Since its appearance in 1960 a rich variety on extensions and additional features has been discussed in the scientific 1 and popular 2 literature.
In the classical secretary problem introduced by Gardner (1960) an employer sequentially observes N girls applying for a secretary job appearing in a random order. She can only observe the relative rank of the current girl compared to applicants already observed and has no additional information on their quality. The applicants can be strictly ordered. Immediately after the interview the employer has to accept the girl or to continue the observation. Rejected applicants do not come back. Based on this information the agent aims to maximize the probability of finding the best girl 3 .
Most of the classical literature in this field assumes that the girls come in random order where all orderings are equally likely. The solution is surprisingly simple. It prescribes to reject a known fraction of girls, approximately N e , and to accept afterwards the next candidate, i.e. a girl with relative rank 1. Such stopping rules are called simple. This strategy performs very well: Indeed, the chance of success is approximately 36, 8% ≈ 1 e for large N . This nice and surprising result is based on the strong assumption that the girls arrive randomly, all possible orderings being equally likely. There are good reasons to care about the robustness of this assumption. From a subjective point of view, the decision maker might not feel secure about the distribution of arrivals -she might face "ambiguity". Even if we take a more objective point of view, we might want to perform a sensitivity analysis of the optimal rule. While there is certainly a degree of randomness in such choice situations, it is not obvious that the arrival probability would be independent of the girl's quality, e.g. It might well be that more skilled applicants find open jobs earlier 4 . In this paper, we present a way of dealing with these questions by embedding the best choice problem into a multiple prior framework as introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for the static case, and extended to dynamic frameworks by Epstein and Schneider (2003b) . The agent works here with a class of possible prior distributions instead of a single one, and uses the minimax principle to evaluate her payoffs. We use then the general theory for optimal stopping under ambiguity developed in Riedel (2009) to analyze the model.
Our main result is that the optimal stopping rule is still simple, or a cutoff rule. The agent rejects a certain number of girls before picking the next applicant that is better than all previous onesin the literature on best choice problems, such applicants are usually called candidates. The optimal strategy thus consists in building up a "database" by checking a certain number of applicants, and to take the first candidate thereafter 5 . We are able to obtain an explicit formula for the optimal threshold that determines the size of the database.
In best choice problems, ambiguity can lead to earlier or later stopping compared to the Bayesian case, in contrast to the analysis in Riedel (2009) where ambiguity leads to earlier stopping. The reason for this is that the original payoff process in best choice problems is not adapted. Indeed, when the employer accepts a candidate, she does not know if that candidate is the best among all applicants. She would have to observe all of them to decide this question. She thus uses her current (most pessimistic) belief about the candidate indeed being the best applicant. Two effects work against each other then. On the one hand, after picking a candidate, the agent's pessimism leads her to believe that the probability of better candidates to come is very high -this effect makes her cautious to stop. On the other hand, before acceptance, she uses a very low probability for computing the chance of seeing a candidate. This effect makes her eager to exercise her option. We illustrate these effects with three classes of examples.
In general, the optimal threshold can be quite different from the classical case (and in this general sense, the 37 %-rule described above 4 Another obvious way of introducing ambiguity concerns the number of applicants. This question is not pursued here; see Engelage (2009) for a treatment of best choice problems with an unknown and ambiguous number of applicants.
5 Optimal stopping rules need not be simple. For example, in the situation with incomplete information about the number of objects a Bayesian approach does not lead to simple stopping rules in general, see Presman and Sonin (1975) .
is not robust). When the highest probability of finding a candidate decays sufficiently fast, the threshold-number of applicants-ratio can be very close to zero; indeed, it is independent of the number of applicants for large N . In such a situation, one has rather an absolute than a relative threshold. Instead of looking at the first 37 % of applicants, one studies a fixed number of them before choosing the first relatively top applicant.
On the other hand, if the probability of finding a candidate at time n is in the interval [ γ n , 1 γn ] for some parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), the threshold-number of applicants-ratio can converge to any positive number between 0 and 1. For γ → 1, we obtain again the 37 % -rule. In this sense, the classical secretary problem is robust.
Last not least, we give an example where the ambiguity about applicants being candidates remains constant over time. This example can be viewed as the outcome of independent coin tosses with identical ambiguity as described in Epstein and Schneider (2003a) 6 . The aim is to pick the last 1 in this series of zeros and ones. We show that the agent optimally skips all but a finite number of applicants. In this case, we the ratio converges to 1 for large N . Different parametrizations of this example show that ambiguity can lead to earlier stopping (when the probability of finding a candidate are known to be small) as well as later stopping compared to the Bayesian case.
On the modeling side, our approach succeeds in finding a model that allows to introduce ambiguity into best choice problems. Note that one has to be careful when introducing ambiguity into dynamic models because one can easily destroy the dynamic consistency of the model 7 . To do so, we reformulate the classical secretary problem in the following way. The agent observes a sequence of ones and zeros, where 1 stands for "the current applicant is the best among the candidates seen so far". The agent gets the payoff of 1 if she stops at a 1 and there is no further 1 coming afterwards. In the secretary problem, the probability of seeing a 1 at time n is 1/n as all orderings are equally likely. We then allow for ambiguity by introducing an interval [a n , b n ] for this probability; finally, we construct a time-consistent model by pasting all these marginal probabilities together as explained in Epstein and Schneider (2003b) .
The analysis of the stopping problem proceeds in three steps. In a first step, we have to derive an equivalent model with adapted payoffs -note that the payoff function is not adapted here because the agent's payoff depends on the events that occur after stopping. We pass to adapted payoffs by taking conditional expectations prior by prior; it is not at all clear that this leads to the same ex ante payoff, though. Time-consistency and the corresponding law of iterated expectations for multiple priors 8 ensure this property. In the second step, we compute explicitly the relevant minimal conditional expectations. After having stopped, the agent uses the maximal probability for seeing a 1 afterwards. Intuitively, the agent's pessimism induces him to suppose that the best candidate is probable to come later after having committed herself to an applicant. After this, we have arrived at an optimal stopping problem that can be solved with the methods developed in Riedel (2009) . Indeed, the problem at hand turns out to be a monotone problem: the worst-case measure can thus be identified as the measure under which the probabilities of seeing a candidate are minimal (until the time of stopping, of course). It then remains to solve a classical Bayesian stopping problem, and we are done. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and provides the stepwise solution as well as the main theorem. Section 3 contains three classes of examples that allow to discuss in more detail the effects of ambiguity in best choice problems.
(Y n ) are also independent, of course, and we have
because all permutations are equally likely. A simple stopping rule first rejects r − 1 applicants and accepts the next candidate, if it exists, i.e.
with τ (r) = N if no further candidate appears after applicant r − 1. One uses independence of the (Y n ) and monotonicity of the value function to show that optimal stopping rules must be simple, see Section 2.1.4 below for the argument in our context. It then remains to compare the expected success of the different simple rules. The event that girl n is a candidate and also the best of all girls means that no further girl has relative rank 1. In terms of our variables (Y n ), this means that Y n = 1 and Y k = 0 for all k > n. The success of a simple strategy is then
The sum approximates the integral of 1/x, so the value is approximately
The maximum of the function −x log x is in 1/e, so we conclude that the optimal r is approximately [N/e] + 1.
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2.1 Best Choice under Ambiguity
Formulation of the Problem
We generalize now the above model to ambiguity by allowing that the probabilities
for all histories Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 come from an interval instead of being a known number. Throughout the paper, we assume that 0 < a n ≤ b n < 1. Modeling ambiguity in dynamic settings requires some care if one wants to avoid traps and inconsistencies. We view the random variables (Y n ) as outcomes of independent, but ambiguous experiments where in the nth experiment the distribution of Y n , i.e. the number P [Y n = 1] is only known to come from an interval [a n , b n ]. From these marginal distributions, the agent has to construct all possible joint distributions for the sequence (Y n ). She does so by choosing any number p n ∈ [a n , b n ] after having observed Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 . A possible prior then takes the form
because the first applicant is always a candidate, and
for a predictable sequence of one-step-ahead probabilities p n . Note that we allow p n to depend on the past realizations of (Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 ). For a time-consistent worst-case analysis this is important because different one-step-ahead probabilities might describe the worst case after different histories. From now on, we work with class P of all probability measures that satisfy (1) and (2) for a given sequence 0 < a n ≤ b n < 1, n = 1, . . . , N . For more on the foundations of dynamic decisions under ambiguity, we refer the reader to Epstein and Schneider (2003b) and Epstein and Schneider (2003a) , see also ?. The astute reader might now wonder why we speak about independent realizations if the conditional probabilities are allowed to depend on past observations. Independence in a multiple prior setting is to be understood in the sense that the interval [a n , b n ] is independent of past observations, just as it means that the conditional probability of the event {Y n = 1} given the past observations is independent of these observations in classical probability. In this sense, the agent does not learn from past observations about the degree of ambiguity of the nth experiment.
We are now ready to formulate our optimization problem. Based on the available information the agent chooses a stopping rule τ that maximizes the expected payoff which is 1 if she happens to find the best girl, and 0 else. A way to describe this in our model is as follows: applicant n is the best if she is a candidate (she has to be relatively best among the first n, of course), and if she is not topped by any subsequent applicant: in other words, we have Y n = 1 and there is no further candidate afterwards, or Y k = 0 for k > n. Let us define
The agent aims to choose a stopping rule τ that maximizes
Reformulation in Adapted Payoffs
The next problem that we face is that the sequence (Z n ) is not adapted to the filtration generated by the sequence (Y n ) because we do not know at the time when we pick an applicant if she is best or not. As in the classical case, we therefore take first conditional expectations of the rewards (Z n ) before we can apply the machinery of optimal stopping theory. In the multiple prior framework we thus consider
where
In the Bayesian framework, it is relatively easy to show that the expected payoffs E[Z τ ] = E[X τ ] are the same for all stopping times τ . In the multiple prior framework, this is less obvious. Indeed, the identity
does require a condition on the set of priors which has become known as rectangularity or m-stability. In our model, this condition is satisfied 10 , and we have 
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Lemma 1 For all stopping times τ we have
We can thus reformulate our problem as maximize inf
over all stopping times τ ≤ N .
Reduction to a Monotone Problem
We are now in the position to apply the general theory of optimal stopping with multiple priors as developed in Riedel (2009) . To this end, let us first have a closer look at the payoffs (X n ). It is clear that X n = 0 if we do not have a candidate at n, i.e. Y n = 0, so we need only to focus on the case Y n = 1. We are then interested in the minimal (conditional) probability that all subsequent applicants are no candidates. It is quite plausible (but requires a proof, of course) that the probability is minimal under the measureP where the probabilities for being a candidate are maximal,P [Y n = 1|Y 1 , . . . , Y n−1 ] = b n . Under this measure, the (Y n ) are independent (because the conditional probabilities for Y n = 1 are independent of past observations, but see the proof of Lemma 2 for the details), and we thus have Lemma 2 The payoffs (X n ) satisfy
The agent faces now a sequence of adapted payoffs that is monotone in Y n (indeed, linear). The random variables (Y n ) are independent under the measure Q where the conditional probabilities for a candidate are
Moreover, the probabilities of finding a candidate are smallest under this measure in the whole class P in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. We are thus in a situation that is called a monotone problem in Riedel (2009) . The general theory there tells us that the optimal stopping rule with multiple priors coincides with the optimal stopping rule under the measure Q -the worst-case measure.
Theorem 1
The optimal stopping rule τ * for (4) is the same as the optimal stopping rule for the Bayesian problem
2.1.4 Optimal Stopping under the Worst-Case Measure Q
We are now back to a classical optimal stopping problem under the measure Q. A standard argument shows that optimal stopping rules must be simple. It works as follows. From classical optimal stopping we know that it is optimal to stop when the current payoff X n is equal to the current value of the problem
The independence of the (X n ) under Q implies that the value of the problem after having rejected n − 1 applicants is independent of the past observations, i.e.
The sequence (v n ) is decreasing as we maximize over a smaller set of stopping times. On the other hand, the numbers
are increasing in n. Now suppose that it is optimal to take a candidate n. We have then B n = v n ; therefore, we get
and it is also optimal to stop when a candidate appears at time n + 1. We conclude that optimal stopping rules are simple.
Lemma 3 The optimal stopping rule τ * is simple, i.e. there exists a number 1 ≤ r * ≤ N , s.t.
In the next step we compute the optimal threshold r * maximizing (7) over all simple strategies. Let us denote by
the payoff from starting to search at applicant r. We then have
and
for r < N . While our recursive formula for φ(r) is useful for numerical computations, we record also the explicit solution of this linear difference equation. To simplify the interpretation of this expression, we introduce two concepts.
Definition 1 For each n ≤ N we call α n = 1 − a n 1 − b n = 1 + b n − a n 1 − b n the degree of ambiguity and β n = a n 1 − b n the ambiguous odds of applicant n.
The first ratio α n measures the ambiguity persisting at the time n. The term tends to 1 as length of the interval [a n , b n ] decreases. In case of a n = b n the node n is completely unambiguous and the decision maker faces only risk at n. Similarly, one can think of the product N k=n α k as the cumulated ambiguity persisting between n and N . The model is unambiguous if and only if N k=1 α k = 1. Note, that we call the ratio p/(1 − p) the odds for a zero-one bet. In a similar way, the ration β n measures the odds of seeing a candidate at time n where we now use the (nonlinear) probability induced by our ambiguity model. Let us check now that φ has a unique maximizer. From our recursion (9), we get that φ(r) − φ(r + 1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to w r ≤ 1 for
As α k > 1 and β n > 0, the sequence (w r ) is strictly decreasing. Thus, (φ(r)) is increasing as long as w r > 1 and decreasing afterwards, which shows that it has a unique maximum. The maximizer is determined by
The optimal threshold r * is determined by the weighted average of ambiguous odds weighted with the ambiguity persisting between r and n. Equation (11) and Equation (12) completely characterize the solution. We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 1. The optimal stopping rule for (3) is simple, i.e. the agent first observes r * candidates and takes then the first candidate that appears; 2. The optimal threshold r * for the cutoff is given via (11) and (12).
Comparative Statics
In this section we use the sequence (w r ) and the variables (α n ) and (β n ) defined above to analyze the effects of ambiguity on stopping and the structure of the stopping strategy τ * . As it was shown in Riedel (2009) , an ambiguity averse decision maker behaves like a Bayesian decision maker under a special worst-case probability measure constructed via backward induction. We have seen in the preceding section how to construct this measure, and that the optimal stopping rule is still simple. The central question by analyzing the effect of ambiguity is now the threshold r * . In case of monotone problems where the payoff is known at the time of decision such as House Selling Problem or Parking Problem discussed in Riedel (2009) ambiguity leads to earlier stopping. The use of the worst-case measure lowers the value of the Snell envelope and forces the agent to stop earlier. The situation differs here because the agent faces actually two kinds of uncertainty. On the one hand, there is payoff uncertainty in the adapted version of the problem because the probability distribution of Y n is not known. This effect leads to earlier stopping because it reduces the expected value from waiting. On the other hand, ambiguity also affects the chances that a better applicant is going to come after the current candidate. This ambiguity induces the agent to wait longer because she believes after stopping that candidates are going to appear with high probability. The two effects work against each other, and we thus proceed to study more detailed models in which we can disentangle them 11 . In addition, we compute the value of the threshold r * and show that asymptotically, the relative fraction of applicants that the agent lets go by can assume any value between 0 and 1.
Ambiguous Secretary Problem
Our first example is the multiple prior version of the classical secretary problem. The decision maker is uncertain about the real distribution of the orderings for reasons explained in the introduction but has no additional information on the quality of the applicants. Doubting her strategy she aims to know what happens if she changes the measure slightly. Instead of P [Y n = 1] = 1 n , the ambiguity averse decision maker assumes that the probability lies in an interval near by Table 1 : Absolute values of the threshold r * for different values of N and levels of ambiguity γ. The threshold is increasing with ambiguity. The agent waits longer before accepting a candidate when ambiguity increases. N / γ 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 5 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 100% 100% 100% 10 40% 40% 50% 50% 50% 50% 60% 70% 100% 50 38% 38% 38% 40% 40% 44% 48% 54% 68% 100 38% 38% 38% 38% 39% 43% 46% 53% 65% 500 37% 37% 37% 38% 39% 42% 45% 51% 63% 1000 37% 37% 37% 38% 39% 42% 45% 51% 63% Table 2 : Relative values of the threshold r * for different values of N and levels of ambiguity γ. Also the relative threshold is increasing with ambiguity. for some γ < 1, 2 ≤ n ≤ N . We can use the analysis of the preceding section to compute the thresholds r * that depends on γ and N , of course. Typical values are tabulated in Table 1 and 2 for the absolute and relative values of the threshold, resp. It is interesting to see that one waits longer as ambiguity increases. The effect of missing a potentially better applicant outweighs the lower expectation from ambiguity. We get here a potentially testable implication: the more uncertain the agent is, the longer she should wait before taking a decisive action in a best choice problem.
The following result gives exact boundaries for the optimal threshold depending upon γ and N .
Theorem 3 For given γ and N , the optimal threshold r * (γ, N ) satisfies
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In particular, the Secretary Problem is robust in the sense that
Independent Coins with Identical Ambiguity
Our example corresponds to the Independent Indistinguishably Distributed case introduced in [ES1] . Here, the probability to meet a candidate remains constant over time. More generally, this is the case, where the decision maker does not know if the experiment changes over time. At the same time she has no reason to distinguish between periods. To express the uncertainty about the coin the agent uses a class of measures in each period. We consider following bet: We observe an ambiguous coin being tossed N times and we win if we stop at the last time {head} appears in the sequence. With this setup we are in the situation of the ambiguous best choice problem where the probabilities for {head} remain constant over time:
To get a feeling for the problem, let us start with the pure risk case, ε = 0. In this case, we get
and the optimal threshold is the first r such that
In this problem, it is optimal to focus solely on the last 1−p p + 1 applicants, irrespective of the total number of applicants.
Let us now come to the ambiguous case. From Equation (11), we obtain for the degree of ambiguity α = 
The threshold r * is given by the first r such that
We learn from this that the agent focuses only on the last
applicants. This quantity is independent of N . In this case we observe memoryless stopping: The decision about stopping does not depend on the number of the options already observed. Only the number of options left matters. Consequently, we obtain
This example also allows us to demonstrate that ambiguity can lead both to earlier as well as to later stopping. For p < 1 2 , the quantity k(p, ε) is increasing; consequently, the agent stops earlier when ambiguity increases. For p = 1/2, k(p, ε) is independent of ε and ambiguity does not influence the stopping behavior. For p > 1/2, the agent stops later, in general.
Finite Stopping
In our last example we consider the case where the probability to meet a candidate falls very fast. Here, the value of waiting decreases very fast and becomes zero at some point. In this situation the future becomes worthless and interviewing additional candidates does not improve the expected payoff. Even if the pool of applicants is infinite the decision will be made in finite time. Here, we can compute the maximal amount of applicants that need to be interviewed in order to decide optimally.
To see how it works we first consider the value of waiting for a fixed number of candidates N and a given one-step-ahead probabilities [a n , b n ]. Now we add an applicant with
Clearly, adding applicants does not decrease the value of the problem. As we vary the number of applicants now, let us write w N r for the crucial sequence that determines the threshold r * (N ). Clearly, w N r is increasing in N and the value of the threshold r * (N +1) ≥ r * (N ). Now assume that w ∞ r := lim N →∞ w N r exists. Then we can find R ∈ N s.t. w ∞ R < 1 and therefore w N R < 1 for all N sufficiently large. Therefore, the value of the threshold r * (N ) cannot exceed R. As r * (N ) is an increasing, but bounded sequence of integers, it has to be constant from some point on, r * (N ) = R for N sufficiently large.
In other words, the number of applicants does not matter here for large pools of applicants. The agent first studies a fixed number of applicants before taking the next candidate. 1 − a n a n
This condition holds true, e.g., when both (a n ) and (b n ) converge fast, say exponentially, to zero. In this section we analyzed the observation period for different sets of measures. Depending on the structure of the set P the observation period converges to a constant c ∈ (0, 1) as in the case of the ambiguous secretary problem. Or it can converge to zero making the future worthless as in the finite stopping case. In the opposite case of memoryless stopping the observation period tends to 1, assigning zero value to the past.
Conclusion
We provide a closed form solution for the best choice problem in the multiple prior framework. An appropriate version of backward induction leads to the solution if the set of priors is time-consistent. Due to time-consistency most of classical arguments remain valid, the stopping rule is simple. The closed form solution allows to analyze the impact of ambiguity on the stopping behavior. Additionally, we show the robustness of the classical secretary problem in the multiple prior framework. A natural next step is to generalize the utility function. Additionally, one might extend the model to infinite settings.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Fix a stopping time τ with values in {1, . . . , N }. Our set of priors is compact, hence we can choose Q k ∈ P that minimize E P X k 1 {τ =k} . Time-consistency of the set of priors implies that there exists a measure Q ∈ P such that
see, e.g., Lemma 8 in Riedel (2009) . It follows that we have
By applying the law of iterated expectations for time-consistent multiple priors, this quantity is
and by applying time-consistency again, we get = inf
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: To show the independence we have to show that ess inf
for aP ∈ P, y i ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ N Because of definition of P all events of above kind have positive probability under every P ∈ P, i.e. P (Y 1 = y 1 , . . . , Y N = y N ) > 0 for all sequences (y i ) with y i ∈ {0, 1} and all P ∈ P. Therefore, using Bayes' rule and the fact that one-step-ahead probabilities [a n , b n ] depend only on time we get where P xn denotes the measure defined via P xn [Y n = y n |F n−1 ] = x n . 2
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof:
We denote by w(γ) n the sequence corresponding to the problem with ambiguity γ. Straightforward calculations show that w n (γ) = 
